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Abstract
Based on interview and questionnair e data obtained from
over 100 ·executives from u.s.-based corporations , this paper
discusses the process by which partners have been selected
for joint ventures (JVs). The paper begins by briefly
highlighting the importance of the partner selection topic,
arguing that potential long term compatibility deserves
increased emphasis when selecting JV partners. Several
selection criteria related to compatibility are identified
and discussed, using numerous illustration s from actual
ventures. The paper then outlines the partner selection
process, including discussion of the key individuals who are
involved, how contacts are initiated with prospective
partners, what the role of top management is, and where and
by whom final decisions are made. The paper concludes by
noting that JVs are typically characterized by on-going
negotiations , suggesting that it may be unwise for managers
to approach the process with a zero-sum game mentality.
In light of the recent groundswell of interest in JVs
and other forms of interfirm collaboratio n, it is expected
that this paper will be of interest to managers and
academics from both descriptive and normative standpoints.

SELECTING JOINT VENTURE PARTNERS IS
EASY ... ALMOSTl

A small technology company, let's call them Alpha Corporation,
developed an advanced design for a computer peripheral. Laoking the
manufacturing and marketing acumen, as well as the financial muscle, necessary
to rapidly commercialize this breakthrough, Alpha's managers decided to seek
assistance via a joint venture (JV). They approached several firms and, after
spending much time in analyzing the technical compatibility between their own
and their prospective partners' companies, agreed to venture with one of the
dominant firms in the industry. They announced their decision amidst great
fanfare--press releases, a company-wide celebration, champagne. Analysts
lauded the decision and predicted spectacular results. Alpha's stock nearly
doubled in value.
Another success story from the Silicon Valley, right? Wrong! Within a year
the venture had been dissolved, Alpha's stock price had tumbled, and the
executives who helped set up the venture had departed for greener pastures.
What had happened? According to the survivors of this debacle, the JV
confronted problems almost from Day One. Because of differences in the
partners' sizes and management styles, venture teams constantly oomplained of
an inability to work together. Managers from Alpha, used to making quick
decisions and then acting upon them, were frustrated by the slow moving
bureaucracy of their larger partner. Alpha's designs were repeatedly, and their
employees thought unnecessarily, subjected to modifications by the partner's
researchers. Product introduction was delayed by several months when the
partner unexpectedly transferred several critical personnel to another project.
Complaints to the partner's headquarters frequently appeared to be ignored.
The venture was ultimately terminated at significant financial cost to both
partners. To make matters worse, the delays enabled one of Alpha's
competitors to beat them to the market with a similar product
1The author would like to gratefully acknowledge the Edna Benson Foundation, Touche-Ross,
and the participating executives. Their assistance made this artide possible.
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Alpha's managers did not adequately consider the difterences between
selecting a partner with compatible skills and selecting a compatible partner.
They wanted to establish a venture which would achieve corporate objectives,
but this meant different things to the two companies. The Alpha Corporation
example is especially insightful because a surprising number of managers do
not probe deeply enough into the issue of compatibility between their own and
their prospective partners' companies. They want very muoh to believe that they
are building a lasting relationship with their partners--but they're not.
Establishing a lasting JV relationship is a complex process, and the degree of
compatibility between partners is but one variable influencing that process. Yet,
although selecting a compatible partner may not always result in a long-lived and
successful joint venture, selection of an incompatible partner virtually guarantees
that the venture's performance will be unsatisfactory.
Previous studies have devoted most of their attention to motivations for
forming a joint venture, as well as managing the venture once it has been
established. In contrast, this article and the research project on which It is based
(see insert) emphasize the process of seleoting joint venture partners. The
discussion which follows is based primarily on a series of interviews with
corporate executives regarding the joint venture experiences of their companies.
These executives, mo-st of whom occupied positions at senior levels of their
management hierarchies, had been intimately involved in the prooess of
identifying and selecting partners for one or more JVs. This article desoribes
how executiv~s perceive the partner selection process, with some emphasis on
how prospective partners are identified, what criteria may be employed when
evaluating a company"s suitability as a partner, and who is typically Involved in
the selection process.
IDENTIFICATION AND SCREENING OF PARTNERS

Finding and courting a partner for a joint venture can be an expensive
process. Costs are not limited to negotiating and writing the legal and operating
agreements. Substantial amounts of time and other resources frequently must
be expended In identifying and screening prospeotive partners prior to the
venture's formation. This is particularly imperative when the company's
management has only limited prior experience with the proposed venture's
products or markets, although the costs can be substantial even if managers
already have a thorougtt knowledge of the venture's industry.

Onsert)

RESEARCH DESIGN
This article is based on a research project that explored U.S.-based
companies' experiences in selecting partners for joint ventures. In his fieldwork,
the author examined the process by which managers identified, evaluated, and
selected prospective partners. To insure spontaneity and openness in
responses, anonymity was guaranteed for all participants and their companies.
Data was collected on numerous topics, including what partner
characteristics were most actively sought--and avoided; how initial contacts
were made with prospective partners; which managers were involved in partner
identification and evaluation, and what roles they assumed; and how and by
whom decisions were made regarding whether, and with whom, to form a joint
venture.
The .author conducted extensive, generally multihour, interviews with over
100 managers who had been intimately involved in selecting partners tor over
250 joint ventures from a wide range of industries. The majority of the ventures
had target markets which included at least one of the industrialized nations.
Nevertheless, based on comments by the participants, most of the findings
should also apply to joint ventures which were not principally oriented toward
serving developed country markets.
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Despite its importance, managers may hesitate to devote a significant
amount of corporate resources to the process of identifying and evaluating an
extensive list of viable partner prospects. This is particularly the case when a
partner with the mininum basic technical requirements appears to have been
found--through an introduction at a convention or trade show, a comment from a
colleague, or some other means. Often, partners appear to have been chosen
for reasons not fully relevant to the organization's objectives and without a
stringent comparison of alternatives. Many JV partners seem to have been
selected almost by accident, or at least without full consideration of how they
might influence the JV's operations. This tendency to abbreviate partner
selection efforts may help account for the widespread perception that Joint
ventures tend to be fraught with problems, including inferior performance, and
that they commonly Oifail" within a relatively short period of time.
PARTNER IDENTIFICATION REQUIRES RESEARCH

As with many other aspects of .N formation, identification of viable partner
prospects is a research task. Managers need to be aware of their firm's
strengths and limitations before taking the first step In searching for prospective
partners. At a minimum, partners should be able to provide the additional
capabilities which, in both the short and the longer-term, are necessary to enable
the venture to be competitive. This means that a manager must analyze the
venture's antioipated target market, as well as the businesses which prospective
partners are currently in or likely to enter in the relatively near future, in order to
identify possible synergies. However, unless a manager has a thorough
knowledge of the venture's industry and the potential players, n~liance on
superficial scanning efforts is unlikely to result in an optimal partner selection
decision. Particularly for fast-moving technologies, such as
telecommunications, biotechnology, or robotics, managers should be cautious
about making assumptions regarding other firms• capabilities. Reputations may
be misleading, and many an executive has felt blind-sided when he belatedly
discovered that a partner did not have the skills necessary for the JV's success.
When identifying partners, there is no single approach whioh will be
preferable in all situations. The evaluation must consider such factors as the
peculiar characteristics of the industry, your firm's competitive position, and the
venture's anticipated requirements for capital and other resources. Typically,
among the first potential partners to be considered are the distributors, suppliers,
and customers for the industry of the proposed venture. Yet, even these
companies must be examined to see which ones are available for venturing and
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which might be preempted from participation due to prior agreements with
oompetitors or similar reasons.
Of course, extensive search and screening efforts are not always a
feasible option. Sometimes, the nature of the proposed investment dictates that
the range of prospective partners is limited. For instance, there may be only one
firm with access to the technology or raw materials needed by the JV. In other
oases, government fiat or regulations regarding foreign ownership may sharply
limit the number of available partner prospects. However, even if only one or a
few viable partner prospects are perceived to exist, this does not diminish the
importance of screening these oompanies for suitability as JV colleagues.
Conflicts between partners are best avoided if anticipated before the venture is
established, so extreme care should be taken in selecting the other party, or
parties. The additional effort you expend up-front in selecting the ••right" partner
may repay itself many times over in avoided costs of misunderstandings, delays,
and divorce.
CRITERIA FOR SELECTING PARTNERS
Attempting to define a set of criteria for selecting the "right" partner would
be roughly analogous to trying to tell a person how to pick the "right" spouse-certainly a difficult, it not an impossible, proposition. The selection of a partner
who will be compatible in the long term is a complex and individualistic
endeavor. Each joint venture is unique in its own way, and must be approached
accordingly. Yet, there do seem to be common elements to many JVs. As a
result, it might be possible to draw from the experience of other managers in
suggesting guidelines to consider when selecting a JV partner. Several
considerations regarding selection criteria are discussed below.
Seek Complementary Technical Skills and Resources
The primary selection criterion is generally a partner's ability to provide
the technical skills and resources which complement those of your company.
Generally, if prospective partners can not satisfy this criterion, then formation of a
joint venture should be a questionable proposition, at best. Therefore, technical
complementarity should be viewed as a minimum qualification for the selection
of a partner.
Technical complementarity is determined by analyzing the critical success
factors--those few areas strongly influencing competitive position and
pertormance--whioh confront the proposed venture. Once this is done, you must
evaluate your company's current and anticipated future competitive position
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relative to these factors. Those areas where deficiencies are perceived to exist
can serve as the basis for assessing the technical complementarity of a partner.
However, your analysis should identify more than merely a financial deficiency-such resources may onen be accessed via other options which will not entail the
extensive managerial involvement of a partner. Although it may have appeal
initially, a JV based solely on a partner"s financial contributions is unlikely to
foster long term compatibility.
Teohnical complementarity can assume many forms. A oommon alliance
consists of technology supplied by one parent and marketing and financial
capabilities furnished by the other. For example, an American medical
equipment company wanted to expand sales of its product line In Europe.
However, because of its small size and limited marketing experience and name
recognition, the company was hesitant to undertake internal efforts .at Increasing
penetration of the European market. Therefore, it sought the assistance of a joint
venture partner. Strategic analysis of the proposed investment suggested that, at
a minimum, a partner would have to be a recognized player in the medical
supplies industry and have access to a suflicient level of financial resources and
managerial talent. The partner would also need a given minimum level of
sophistication with the relevant technologies so that its employees could
competently demonstrate the technical advantages of the American firm's
products. Companies which did not satisfy this set of criteria were rejected as
possible co-venturers.
Seeking a partner with complementary technical skills and resources can
permit each partner to concentrate its resources in those areas where it
possesses the greatest relative competence, while diversifying into attraotive but
unfamiliar business arenas. Rather than intensifying weaknesses, .Ns can thus
be a means of creating strengths.
Mutual Dependency: A Necessary Evil
American managers have traditionally viewed dependenoy upon other
companies or individuals as undesirable, and have avoided such situations
whenever possible. However, in identifying suitable JV partner prospects, there
should be some identifiable mutual need, with each partner supplying unique
capabilities or resources which are viewed as critical to the venture's success.
Proper matching should result in both partners perceiving that they have a vested
interest in keeping the venture working, rather than resorting to some non-JV
form of investment. By having one partner strong where the other is weak, and
vice versa, mutual respect will be fostered and second-guessing and oonflict can
be mitigated.
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Prior experience suggests that there should be a .. middle level .. of
dependency between partners. If the level of dependency is too small, then the
JV is unlikely to survive difficult times. On the other hand, too great of a
dependency may prove unstable because of fears of the devastating
consequences of the loss of a partner. The latter case commonly occurs when a
small firm forms a .N with a much larger partner. The small firm may feel
insecure, since it would be unable to fully exploit a market opportunity by itself, or
only at a much slower rate and at a greater risk than might be the case in a
shared endeavor. The smaller firm tends to be hungrier, and may need the sales
revenues from the .N more than the larger partner. In addition, as discussed
earlier with the Alpha Corporation example, association with a prominent partner
may cause a smaller concern's stock value to rise. This is particularly worrisome
if later termination of the venture is perceived as attributable to a failure to
successfully commercialize the smaller firm's technology. While the larger firm
may emerge from the venture virtually unscathed, JV termination may severely
disable the small firm by causing customers, ernpl('-yees, and Wall Street to
question the firm's viability. The resulting damage to ll£" reputation may cause a
precipitous decline in its stock value, harming morale ii.lnd limiting the available
strategic options.
Painful lessons regarding dependency between partners were
experienced by many companies which, in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
formed ventures with Asian firms as a means of rapidly acoessing cheap labor or
new markets. Frequently, the American corporations contributed the initial
technology and some of the financing, and they trained their partners in the
intricacies of running the business. Once this was accomplished, several of the
ventures were dissolved and the partners later used technology obtained from
the JV as a weapon against their former U.S. allies.
Several options are available for helping to insure that JV partners will
continue to perceive themselves as mutually dependent. One method of
reinforcing mutual dependence is to establish some means of "exchanging
hostages." For instance, it is often possible to insert conditions into a JV
agreement whereby a unilateral decision to prematurely break up the corporate
marriage will result in a substantial charge of some sort, "alimony" payments it
you will, as well as covenants against engaging in competing activities within a
specified time period. It may also be possible to guarantee cross purchases of
specified volumes of products or services by the partners. This option can help
reduce the potentially devastating impact of a break-up upon a more-dependent
firm by guaranteeing access to critical raw materials or sales revenues during
the painful readjustment period. By employing techniques such as these, the
threat posed by dependency on a partner can be reduced substantially.
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Avoid •Anchors•
When contemplating a JV, be sure that your prospective partner is able to
generate the given minimum level of financial resources necessary for
maintaining the venture's efforts. Although this minimum amount varies
dramatically between JVs, managers frequently note their avoidance of partners
which are likely to become ••anchors," slowing venture growth and development
due to an inability or unwillingness to provide their share of the funding. As the
vice president of a major manufacturing concern remarked, "Partners will almost
always have differences of opinion regarding expansion. A small company may
have fewer financial resources available for shouldering its portion of an
expansion, or have to pay a higher financing rate than does the larger partner.
This can not only cause operating problems, but may also result in some bruised
egos, which can further intensify the difficulties."
A partner's inability to fulfill its financial commitments, whether due to
small size, to financial difficulties in its other operations, or to the existence of
different discount rates and time horizons, can create turmoil for the venture and
its managers. Particularly in the early stages of a JV, when large negative cash
flows are more likely to be encountered, the presence of an "anchor" can
jeopardize an entire project, forcing a premature buy-out or termination.
Commenting on his company's experiences with a smaller firm, one senior
executive commented that, "The joint venture was functioning_~uite smoothly and
was meeting or surpassing both companies' projections until the financial
demands exceeded (the other company's) capabilities •••• The resulting
animosities ultimately caused the venture to be dissolved."
Although it is not always possible to identify potential "anchors," several
tell-tale signs may suggest the need for further inquiry. As one executive
suggested, "You have to look at the partner's balance sheet and ask: 'Is it a
financially solid company?' You have to look at their plans for growth and their
profit orientation. Is there a difference in the strategic importance placed on the
JV's activities? Is the partner likely to confront financial problems in one or more
divisions? If so, what will be the effect upon other activities of the partner,
especially the JV?"
A prospective partner's resource constraints oan constitute a significant
hurdle to the establishment of a successful JV. However, if proper precautions
are observed, the presence of a partner with meager financial resources need
not prevent JV formation or force a venture's termination. Especially when
insufficient financial oontributions are not due to financial insolvency, it may be
possible to reduce noncompliance with the agreement by including penalties if
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either partner attempts to back out of the relationship or otherwise sidestep its
financial obligations. It might also be possible to stipulate that the companies
can not engage in similar activities for a specified period of time. Furthermore,
the agreement might be structured to allow shareholdings or payouts to be
contingent upon the level of each partner's contributions, thus minimizing
perceived inequities which might result from disparities in financial contributions.
The use of these and similar mechanisms can reduce the undesirable effects of
an "anchor" upon JV activities.
Relative Company Size: The Elephant and the Ant Complex
Relative company size is often of paramount concern when evaluating a
prospective partner. Although exceptions are numerous, joint ventures often will
have the best chance of succeeding if both parents are comparable in
sophistication and size, preferably large. When a small company deoides to .N
and chooses a partner of similar size, the two companies frequently magnify
each other's weaknesses. This is less often the case between two large firms,
which are likely to have similar values and control systems, similar tolerances f<.tr
losses, and similar appetites for risk. Crises are less common in large firms,
particularly in regard to short term cash flow. Thus, larger companies typically
offer greater "staying power, .. being able to commit a more substantial volume of
resources over a longer time horizon.
Yet, sometimes a venture between firms of different sizes seems
warranted. Size differences may yield synergies for the partners. A smaller
company with innovative technology may decide to venture with a large
corporation with ttte financial and marketing clout necessary to commercialize
that technology, as was the case with the Alpha Corporation example. Similarly,
Nike, an innovative designer of athletic shoes, teamed up with Nissho lwai,
Japan's sixth-largest trading company. And in 1978, Advanced Micro Devices,
with $6Z million in sales, formed a joint venture with Siemens A. G., West
Germany's largest electrical oompany, to produce a line of microoomputer
systems and related products.
When partners evidence significant size discrepanoies--dubbtd "the
elephant and the ant complex.. by one executive--managers must be aware of the
problems which may result. One frequently voiced ooncern is the possible
domination of one company over the other, as addressed earlier during the
discussion of mutual need. A related problem which may arise from extreme
size discrepancies is that the different operational environments and corporate
cultures of the partners may appear incompatible. For instance, the typically
bureaucratic environment of many large firms, with a relatively slow decision
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making apparatus and a voracious appetite for information gathering and
analysis, sharply contrasts with the more entrepreneurial and quick-response
orientation characteristic of small firms. A small business, accustomed to
reacting within short time frames, may feel paralyzed by the seemingly glacial
pace at which the larger company operates. Yet, the.small company's prodding
and sense of urgency may make the larger partner nervous--a nervousness
whioh may seem justifiable. The large company may interpret its smaller
partner's spartan environment and informality as indicative of a fly-by-night, shoestring operation that may not remain in business for long. Furthermore, the
larger firm may perceive that most or all of the risk is being borne by itselfeducating a sales force and customers about a new produors features:
assuming responsibility for warehousing, distribution, and sometimes
production; lending credibility to the product, along with enhancing the prestige
and financial status of the smaller firm. As a result, the larger firm may exercise
even greater caution in its activities, further exacerbating the problem.
As the above suggests, differences in management style, decision making
orientation, and perspective on time may effectively result in corporate culture
shook, frustrating management from each partner and hindering the
development and maintenance of good rapport. Therefore, a JV between
companies of widely disparate sizes often necessitates the creation of a special
environment in order to foster successful venture development For instance, it
might be possible to reduce the effect of partner size differences upon JV
performance by giving the venture virtually a free hand in product development or
other activities, minimizing administrative red tape and permitting quicker
response time. This emphasis on autonomy might be a particularly appropriate
option when the venture's environment is characterized by rapid change, and
slow response might be akin to a kiss of death for the JV. The willingness of a
partner to cooperate in this effort might constitute a critical factor in the partner
selection decision.
Even when managers express a strong desire for working with a partner
with a similar "systems" orientation, that need not dictate ventures between
same-size corporations. On the contrary, the relevant measure often is not
absolute corporate size, but the relative size of the respective business units.
Therefore, managers may seek partners evidencing similar size at the business
or division, rather than corporate, level. Another possibility for minimizing the
effect of size differences is for a small firm to try to identify a large firm which is
both hungry and has the marketing, financial, or technical muscle necessary for a
successful venture. This may require greater diligence in identifying and
contacting partners, however, since these are all attributes which tend to be
found in certain individuals or business units rather than in the organization as a
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whole. Yet, their presence helps ensure that the larger partner will be sufficiently
aggressive to maintain respect from customers and competitors, and there is a
greater likelihood that both partners will have similar perceptions of time as a
vital component in the venture's success.
Strategic Complementarity: A Prerequisite for Long Term Success

Although partner size is an important criterion for many companies, it is
commonly asserted that relative size is not as important as complementarity
among the partners' strategic goals and objectives. Achieving a strategic fit
between companies· objectives for the joint venture is neoessary for maintaining
long-term commitment to the joint venture. From the outset of discussions, each
partner must strive to clearly understand what the other participants desire from
the union. As one seasoned veteran commented, "It is remarkable how many
joint ventures are consummated where one or both partners do not otearly state
their objectives. Under these circumstances, venture failure is almost inevitable...
Different objectives in forming a particular JV, including the timing and
level of returns on their investments, frequently produoes oonflicts of interest
between partners. For instance, one executive reflected upon a previous JV
involving his company and an Asian firm. He noted that the venture evidenced a
lack of strategic fit between the partners• objectives: his company sought rapid
market access and a high rate of dividend repatriation so that its stock price
would be maximized, enhancing an expansion strategy based on exchanges of
stock. The partner, on the other hand, sought transfer of technology and long
term market development, rather than rapid tinanoial returns. As a result ot these
differences, the JV performed poorly and was abandoned within a couple of
years. The partner was reported to have used t~e acquired technological
expertise to expand its own market position in Asia.
As partners• objectives diverge, there is an Increasing risk of
dissatisfaction and associated problems. This risk may be heightened when the
venture•s environment is characterized by a high level of uncertainty, since
changes in a JV's operations are more likely under these circumstances.
Unexpected events can cause problems because of the difficulty of formulating a
mutually acceptable response to change. A power game can result, and the
venture can collapse if the partners cannot reach an agreement on an
appropriate course of action.
However, divergence of corporate objectives can lead to a venture's
downfall even if performance is satisfactory. For example, Dow-Badisohe was
formed in 1958 as a 50/50 joint venture between Dow Chemical and BASF of
Germany, and it achieved good profitability over much of its life. Nevertheless,
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despite $300 million in annual sales, the venture was ultimately dissolved. BASF
wanted to expand the venture, but Dow was reluctant to oontribute additional
capital since the venture's activities did not seem to fit within the firm's strategic
focus. The gap between oorporate objectives widened to the point where BASF
bought out Dow's shares in 1978 and transformed the venture into a whollyowned U.S. subsidiary.
Although determining the objectives of a prospective partner is often
difficult, it is an essential task nevertheless. Failure to do so may significantly
increase the prospect of later problems. The analysis needs to address not only
the oompany•s current situation and objectives, but also its likely future position.
The rationale for this is that JVs frequently encounter changes in their operating
environments, and it is essential that companies anticipate how their partner is
likely to be affected by, and respond to, these changes. JVs only tend to work as
long as each partner perceives that it is receiving benefits, or is likely to benefit in
the relatively near future. Because of differences in objectives, what is good for
one company may be a disaster for the other party.
An executive illustrated this situation through analogy to the search for a
spouse: one must find a mate who is likely to change in similar ways with
changes in the environment, or the relationship is unlikely to survive. Therefore, a
compatible partner would ideally be one with similar values and objectives, in
both a short and a long term sense. Such a situation will enhance the ability of
managers to interpret one another's estimates, such as sales forecasts,
development schedules, and cost estimates. This is particularly critical as the
strategic stakes--the size of investment, potential effect on corporate image, or
relationship to the organization's core technologies--increase in scale.
Evaluate Compatibility Between Partners· Operating Policies

Another consideration when selecting a partner involves the similarity of
partners• operating policies and procedures. Executives related several
instances where differences between the partners• policies--such as personnel
procedures, accounting and finance conventions, and strategic planning
cycles--had caused significant problems for JVs. For instance, one venture was
nearly dissolved because inconsistencies between the partners• accounting
systems repeatedly produced disagreement regarding timing of purchases,
allocation of costs, and so forth. Since the JV was only marginally profitable, the
method of reconciling disagreements could determine whether or not the venture
would appear on the parents• books as a profitable operation, an important
consideration for the division-level management teams. Another executive
reported that differences in vacation policies between his firm and his European
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partner created serious difficulties for their JV because the latter company shut
down virtually all operations for a month each summer, whereas the U.S.-based
firm allowed employees to schedule their own vacation time. As a result, the
venture repeatedly encountered operationally-related difficulties.
Partners should be clear regarding the types of policies they will be
comfortable working with. For example, a U.S. firm is typically accustomed to
operating with a lower debt-to-equity ratio than is the case for a Japanese
partner. These policies should be addressed thoroughly before the venture is
formed. Differences in operating approaches may often result from cultural
biases, and managers may not be conscious of their existence. They may take
for granted that there is a "right" way to do certain things. · As one Japanese
manager stated, "Many American executives attempt to force their Japanese
partners to adopt American methods of operation, in disregard of the distribution
structure and other financial and management methods whioh have prevailed in
Japan for a long time. For this reason, many joint ventures in Japan ultimately
fail." As these examples illustrate, companies may frequently need to consider
the compatibility of partners' operating policies and procedures when
considering formation of a venture.
Be Aware of Potential Communication Barriers
Communication is another potential problem area. By nature, .Ns tend to
be fragile agreements, and communication problems make it even more difficuH
for them to function as intended. Basically, such problems may occur as a result
of differences between national or ethnic cultures, including language, as well as
differing corporate cultures. Cultural differences can impede the development of
rapport and understanding between partners. You should not overlook the
importance of a partner with adequate English-language capability, or your firm's
facility with the language of the partner. The simple ability to communicate with
one's counterpart in the partner firm can often make a significant difference in a
venture's prospects for success, and the absence of this ability has been the
cause of more than a few disasters.
Because of cultural or language differences, subtle nuanoes may be more
difficult to communicate, thereby necessitating greater expenditures of time in
negotiations and possibly delaying not only JV formation, but also major postformation decisions. The use of buzzwords common to many Industries tends to
compound language problems. When buzzwords are used, misunderstandings
can arise regarding each company's role in a joint venture. Especially in
technology-oriented fields, commonly used terms may not have the same
connotations for each partner. For example, specifications for the Boeing 767
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jetliner called for fuselage panels to have a "mirror finish." Boeing's Japanese
partners interpreted that specification too literally and engaged In excessive
polishing efforts. As a result, the labor costs for the initial panels were excessive,
necessitating further discussions to resolve the misunderstanding. Because of
the risk of misinterpretations, it may often be advisable to attempt to substitute
simple, .. Dick-and-Jane"-type terminology for technical jargon during
negotiations and follow-up discussions.
The existence of different cultural perspectives implies value systems that
are not necessarily compatible; you cannot assume that promoting interests from
one perspective will necessarily promote interests from another. However,
managers should avoid the alternative assumption that different value systems
will necessarily be incompatible. Values associated with different perspectives
may be similar, even if only slightly, or they may be irrelevant to each other; it is
not common for them to be in complete opposition.
Prior experience suggests that language and culture tend not to be
insurmountable barriers, particularly for partners from industrialized nations,
although they can be an important handicap. Therefore, although cultural
barriers are often considered when evaluating prospective partners, and
especially when choosing between two otherwise equivalent partner prospects,
they seldom function as the dominant selection criterion.
Compatible Management Teams Help Reduce Problems
It may be desirable to select a partner whose management team is

compatible with one's own. Personal rapport between the principal deoision
makers is often an important factor in the selection decision, and the inability of
management to "take to each other" has frequently been cited as the basis for
rejecting a prospective partner or for terminating a venture. Close personal
relationships, particularly among the senior managers, helps to nurture the level
of understanding necessary for a successful JV relationship. Managerial
compatibility can enhance the partners' ability to achieve con census on critical
policy decisions, as well as facilitating efforts to confront and overcome the
frequent roadblocks encountered during joint venture formation and operation.
Although building relationships between partners' managers takes time--a
commodity many executives perceive to be in short supply when pursuing
formation of a venture--it is an invaluable element of most successful JVs. This
particularly characterizes ventures with Japanese firms, for whom establishment
of close personal rapport is customarily a requirement before business
negotiations can be concluded.
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In many ways, it may seem unfortunate that JVs are so heavily dependent
on personal rapport between a few individuals. Because of the informal nature
of these relationships, including extensive utilization of unwritten "gentlemen's
agreements," reliance upon executive rapport may lead to unnecessary disputes
and conflicts of interests at a later date. To reduce the prospects of such turmoil,
an additional consideration when selecting a partner may be the likelihood of
continuity among the critical personnel within a partner's management team.
Continuity among the principal managerial participants can help minimize the
incidence of misunderstandings between partners. In this regard, several
managers commented that Japanese executives had expressed hesitancy about
forming JVs with U.S. companies, because the typically higher levels of
management turnover in American firms hindered establishment and
maintenance of close relations among the partners' managers.
Trust and Commitment: Essential Elements of Long Term Relationships
Forming and operating a successful joint venture may not be synonymous
with the maintenance of friendly and cordial relationships between the partners•
management teams. The perceived trustworthiness and commitment of a
partner appears to have been a pivotal consideration when selecting many JV
partners. Human chemistry is essential to the development and maintenance of
trust and commitment, and interactions between management help provide the
necessary foundation for their establishment. These interactions permit eaoh
partner to gain a greater understanding of the people they will be working with,
including their values, concerns, and needs, thus helping to assuage potential
suspicions regarding a partner. One executive, noting the importance of mutual
trust and commitment in the partner selection decision and the process for
evaluating these traits, likened the process to a "mating dance.·· He visualized
the prospective partners as cautiously approaching each other, trying to "strut
their stuff" and create favorable impressions, engaging in an often lengthy ritual
of evaluating the probability of mutual attraction and compatibility before either
would oommit itself fully to the venture. Without full commitment by both parties,
JVs tend to become only short term relationships, or "flings," often followed by
divorce and parent-less "children." For this reason, great emphasis tends to be
placed on the selection of partners which evidence trustworthiness and
commitment to the venture, particularly by executives with more extensive JV
experience.
The need for trust and commitment between partners is especially critical
if a proposed venture involves activities closely related to your firm's
technological core. The technological core of many firms is the essence of their
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corporate strategies and competitive advantage. A manager may
understandably react with some level of initial distrust regarding potential
partners' motives. It is useful to recall the inherent fragility of joint ventures when
choosing partners, since today's partners could become tomorrow's
competitors. As one CEO noted, "You've got to be sure that you're working with
earnest and ethical people who aren't trying to undermine your company.
Usually, a partner will have aooess to your trade secrets. He might attempt to

complete a few projects, learn what you do, then exclude you from future deals."
Baring your technological core to a partner who is not able to adequately
protect this knowledge from technological then or bleed-through can threaten
your company's competitiveness. As a result, an intuitive response may be to
seek majority control, if not full ownership, of any venture, and then to hover over
every decision the child might make--particularly if you do not trust a partner's
intentions. Yet, such a response is unlikely to promote compatibility.
Many managers take the position that, given the likelihood of some
misunderstanding between the partners, the JV agreement should address every
conceivable contingency. In contrast, managers experienced in JVs emphasize
the building of mutual trust and understanding, which make the formal written
agreement more a symbol of a commitment to cooperate than an actual working
document. As one C. E. 0. commented, partners generally "don't start looking at
the specifics of the venture agreement until the relationship starts breaking down
and you're contemplating getting out."
Regardless of protections written into the JV agreement, no legal
document is fail-safe. "You can write all sorts of legal contracts and other formal
agreements, but the partners must trust each other and be committed to the
venture in order for it to work," noted an executive. "A partner may be able to
muster a virtual battalion of lawyers, making it very expensive lor you to take a
grievance to court, much less to win it." Therefore, you must be comfortable that
the partner will honor the spirit, not just the letter, of the agreement. onen,
particularly for ventures involving the Japanese, demands to develop extensive
formal contracts dealing with every conceivable dispute will be viewed as
evidence of mistrust. Managers are to be reminded that a JV relationship is
delicate at best and complicated at worst, and without fundamental trust and
commitment by each party there is little hope for a working partnership.
Although the preceeding discussion presents what may appear to be a
rather long list of criteria, managers with JV experience will probably be able to
add others. Admittedly, these suggestions constitute an ideal set of conditions,
and there may be few situations where each of these will be fully aohieved.
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Nevertheless, the above provides a foundation for the identification and
evaluation of potentially compatible JV partners.
JOINT VENTURE SPONSORS

In selecting JV partners, there are people from each company who play a
particularly critical role in the process. Examination of prior ventures reveals that
there are usually 1 to 3 key individuals, or sponsors, who are oritical to the
partner selection decision and to efforts to implement a joint venture agreement.
Typically, these individuals beoome involved very early in the selection process
and occupy line, rather than staff, positions in the upper-middle to upper levels of
the management hierarchy.
The JV sponsors serve as catalysts for the process of identifying,
evaluating, and negotiating with prospective partners. Because lley funotion as
the driving force for the venture's formation, their continued involvement in the
partner selection and JV formation process is essential. For this reason, the
existence of more than one sponsor in each partner company may enhance
prospects for successful JV formation. When a oompany has only one primary
sponsor, loss of that individual--due to transfer, turnover, or other cause-frequently either results in termination of formation efforts within a relatively short
time period or significantly delays the negotiation process while relationships are
established with the new sponsor. However, when more than one sponsor exists
within a company, loss of one of them may create problems, but the process of
forming and operating the JV is generally able to proceed with only minor
delays.
Because of their central role in the formation process and the broad range
of activities which must be addressed, certain types of managers seem to be
more effective as JV sponsors. In general, successful sponsors have been
characterized by skills related to broader and more generalized line capabilities,
rather than evidencing more narrow technical specialties such as law,
accounting, or other support functions. In addition to their general management
orientation, at least one of the sponsors from each partner oompany should also
be fluent with the principal function(s) which the JV is expected to engage in,
such as R&D, manufacturing, or marketing. When sponsors embody these traits,
their ability to evaluate and negotiate with prospective partners is significantly
enhanced. Yet, despite this caveat, a surprising number of firms have delegated
responsibility for partner selection and negotiation to staff members, especially
lawyers, who may be ill-equipped to function as full-fledged sponsors of the JV.
As a result, they are often unable to effectively champion the venture, further
hindering formation efforts.
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INVOLVEMENT OF TOP MANAGEMENT IS CRUCIAL

Especially for larger JVs and those accorded high strategic importance,
top management of the company generally has some degree of direct
participation in the partner selection process. These very senior level executives
generally do not assume an active role as one of the key sponsors ohampioning
the venture. Nevertheless, their participation is often pivotal in the successful
formation and functioning of a JV, due to their ability to communicate the
company's commitment to a prospective partner as well as to employees within
their own firm. Top management involvement can help prevent or overcome
deadlocks or other disagreements between the partners• operating-level
personnel. Their participation also confers legitimacy to the proposed JV,
helping to develop and sustain the commitment necessary to successfully
complete the process of partner selection and JV formation.
LOCATION OF THE PARTNER SELECTION DECISION

The final decision regarding partner selection is almost always made at
the corporate level, usually involving a vote of the board of directors. However,
except for very large JVs and those which are very intimately related to a
company's core business activities, the de lao/odeoisions regarding partner
selection and venture formation are typically made by business unit or division
level management, rather than at the corporate level. This fact further reinforces
the importance of assigning extremely competent individuals to the JV task force,
especially when those individuals are expected to function as the JV's sponsors.
THE ON-GOING NATURE OF JV NEGOTIATIONS

Managers should recognize that JVs are usually characterized by ongoing negotiations, even after the initial stages of discussions are concluded and
the joint venture is formally established. This is true regardless of the absolute
sharing of the venture's equity. Whether the equity is split equally or if one
partner has a majority share, ooncensus is still desirable on major decisions. A
minority partner consistently finding itself outvoted and relegated to sub-par
performance is less likely to perceive that its strategic objectives are being
attained. As a result, the probability that problems will arise is increased.
It is inevitable that changes in the internal and external environment will
occur. Under such circumstances, strict reliance on the initially negotiated
contract may produce less than satisfactory performance for one or both of the
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partners, thus threatening the venture's long term viability unless modifications
are implemented. While not all aspects of a joint venture agreement may be
subject to renegotiation, the principal impetus for re-opening discussions on
some or all parts of the JV agreement is concern over potential inequities or
domination. Since a balanced agreement is essential to the maintenance of
trust, circumstances which produce perceived imbalances typically result in
partner outcry and pressure for modifications to the agreement. To the extent
that partners perceive incompatibilities between themselves and their venture
mates and an inability to rectify the situation, what begins as a relatively minor
annoyance may mushroom into a significant, and possibly fatal, souroe of
friction.
One means of minimizing problems within a joint venture is to maintain
continuity among the key personnel. Because of their on-going relationship with
their peers in the partner organization, they are a critical element in the
maintenance of mutual trust. Personnel ohanges, especially among the venture's
sponsors, can threaten the personal chemistry which has been built up between
partners and necessitate further negotiations to re-establish this human balance.
Although several firms have consciously exploited this tendency as a means of
re-opening negotiations, be forewarned that such a strategy may also entail
significant risks.
AVOID ZERO-SUM GAME MENTALITY

In the end, the partner selection decision is generally based on nonquantifiable human judgment, especially the judgment of those individuals
serving as the venture's sponsors. In this regard, managers should refrain from a
tendency to approach negotiations as a zero-sum game. Because of the
presumed long term nature of the relationship and the need for fostering mutual
trust and commitment, attempting to "beat" the partner in the negotiation stage
will generally prove dysfunctional in the long run. As one food industry executive
stated, "'The content of any proposed agreement should be reasonable for all
parties. If you believe it's reasonable, don•t hesitate to lobby strongly for it.
However, it's useless to pursue an unreasonable agreement. Even if you're able
to convince the partner to initially agree to it, he'll eventually feel cheated and the
agreement will ultimately fail ...
For some, the idea of cooperating with a partner appears to stand in
direct opposition to a corporate value system holding self-sufficiency and
aggressive competition as central ideals. Yet, regardless of the size or type of
business, the JV must be founded and operated in the spirit of compromise and
cooperation. A parent unwilling to recognize this principle should pursue other,
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non-:-JV options, or it will find itself confronting constant difficulties. An
inequitable agreement, unless remedied, can result in deadlocks or dissolution,
causing the partners to suffer foregone opportunities, lost capital and other
resources, and compromised proprietary information, as well as an enormous
amount of stress and emotional anguish.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

Joint ventures marrying corporate partners can be a valuable option for
many firms and projects, and may be a less harrowing option than going it alone.
But oaution is necessary when selecting a partner. It Is easy for companies to
get married, yet if the courting ritual is not conducted in a thorough manner, a
divorce is likely. The result--long and acrimonious legal battles, parent-less
''children, •• and possibly serious soars for one or more of the partners--may
place the companies in a worse position than was the case prior to entering the
JV.
Suooess or failure of a JV depends not only on a venture's l;nderlying
strategic rationale, but also on how well partner companies oan W\ifk together,
despite differences in management styles, strategies, resources, and culture.
The effeot of such corporate chemistry is difficult to predict and control, but it is a
critical consideration since JV agreements usually provide each partner witt• an
on-going role in the venture's management. Compatibility of the partners,
beyond mere teohnioal complementarity, is an important prerequisite for a
suooessful corporate marriage. This is particularly important with regard to the
selection of partners, due to the influence this decision may have on theN's
performance.
With regard to the identification of suitable partner prospects, analysis of
past JVs suggests that there is no single approach which promises to provide
optimal results in every situation. Rather, the method will be contingent upon the
nature of the proposed investment. However, in developing criteria for selecting
partners, it is essential that managers select a partner which offers strong
prospects for developing an effective long term working relationship. Partners
have a tendency to crystallize into personalities, of which some types may not be
conducive to the venture's long term viability. Although satisfying the perceived
technical requirements of ttte JV is a necessary element of the JV partner
selection decision, it is generally not sufficient. It should be apparent that the
partners, linked together, will form a complete business, both in terms of
technical capabilities and in terms of their ability to suooessfully interact.
Management of a joint venture is different from typical business activities,
because it may involve a mixture of, and sometimes clashes between, different
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cultures, thought patterns, and attitudes toward competition. There is a strong
tendency for managers, particularly those without significant prior experience in
JV formation, to view their prospective ventures as unique. This often translates
into a perception that the JV experience of others has only limited applicability
for their own circumstances. However, adamant assertions of the "uniqueness"
of a particular JV may often be overstated. Although each situation will evidence
unique elements, there do seem to be common elements in some, if not all,
aspects of the joint venture formation process. For this reason, the process of
locating suitable JV partners should, when possible, be carried out with the
assistance of competent advisors who are thoroughly familiar with the law and
business practices of the target industry and market.
Because of the presumed long-term nature of most joint venture
relationships and the costs associated with premature dissolution, there tend to
be relatively high financial and human costs associated with the selection of
partners for successful JVs. Firms must be willing to incur substantial search
costs, including those associated with criteria development and partner
identification and evaluation, as well as the extensive resource expenditures
typically involved in the negotiation stage. In addition, the process needs to be
approached with considerable patienoe and realistic expectations. If a company
is unwilling to accept these preconditions, then it should probably consider other
investment options, rather than trying to minimize resource expenditures by
cutting corners on the quantity and quality of effort expended on the partner
selection and evaluation process.
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